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STA1E OF UTAH 
ROBERT L. VELASQUEZ, by and 
through his Guardian Ad Litem, 
CORINNE F. MUNIZ, 
Plaintif f-AppeUxmt, 
vs. 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COM-




STATE OF UTAH, PUBLIC SERVICE 
COMMISSION, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Cruse No. 
11883 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff was injured when the vehicle :in which he 
was asleep and riding as a passenger was struck by a Union 
Pacific Railroad Company train aJt a grade crossing in a 
residential area in Sandy, Uta!h on March 9, 1968. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Summary Judgment was entered Sep't.ember 19, 1969 
in favor of Defendant-Respondent. 
2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an ,affirmance of the District Court's 
order of Summary Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 9, 1968 at approximwtely 11 :50 p.m., plain-
tiff was a passenger and asleep in a pickup truck driven 
by Manuel Ortega, which pickup truck was proceeding 
easterly on 400 North Street in Sandy, Utah, when a coni-
sion occurred between said pickup truck and one of Union 
Pacific Railroad Company's locomotives, which was travel-
ing in a southerly direction, at the grade crossing at 400 
North near 100 East Street, in Sandy City, Utah, and :that 




STATE OF UTAH, PUBLIC SERVICE COM-
MISSION, WAS AT ALL TIMES ACTING IN 
ITS CAPACITY AS A GOVERNMENTAL EN-
TITY OF THE STATE OF UTAH, AND, AS 
SUCH, IS IMMUNE FROM THIS SUIT. 
The Public Service Commission comes within the mean-
ing of "StaJte" as defined in U. C. A. 63-30-2(1) (1953), 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, and the word "state" 
is within the iterm ".governmental entity" as defined in 
63-30-2 (3). Therefore, fue Public Service Commission is 
included within ithe term "governmental entity" as defined 
in 63-30-2 ( 3) and used in 63-30-3 and 63-30-10. U. C. A. 
63-30-3 states : 
··gxcept as may be otherwise provided in this 
act, ail governmental entities shall be immune from 
suit, for any injury which may result ac-
tivities of said entities vvherein said entity is en-
gaged in the exercise and discharge of a govern-
mental function." (Emphasis added.) 
In order for appellant to maintain an action against 
respondent, they must show a specific waiver of this im-
munity. It is apparent from the statute there is no specific 
waiver available. U. C. A. 63-30-10 provides: 
"Immunity from suit of all governmental en-
tities is waived for injury proximately caused by 
a negligent act or omission of an employee com-
mitted wi,tlrin the scope of his employment except 
if the injury: ( 1) arises out of the exercise or per-
formance or the failure to exercise or perform a 
discretionary function, whether or not the discretion 
is abused." 
This statute has come before rbhis court in the case of 
Sheffield v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 314, 445 P. 2d 367, (1968). 
This cou:rit said that: 
"The ancienibly established and almost univers-
ally recognized general rule which this court has 
con.sistently announced and adhered to is that the 
government, its agencies and officia;ls performing 
governmental functions are protected by sovereign 
immunity." 
The Court compared this general rule with the Governmen-
tal Immunity Act, 63-30-10 U. C. A. (1953), dealing Wi1Jh 
waiver of immunity. This Court pointed out that, even 
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though the act provides for a waiver of immunity, it still 
preserves immunity in certain areas. The Sheffield case 
dealt specifically vvlith the exception of injuries arising out 
of incarcerations, 63-30-10 (3) U. C. A. 1953. In the case 
at bar, we are concerned with the exception in 63-30-10(1) 
mentiioned above. 
The principle enunciated by the court in the Sheffield 
case applied with equal force to both subsections, and the 
Public Service Commission has governmental rimmun:ity as 
provided for in U. C. A. 63-30-10(3) and as such is immune 
from suit in this aobion. 
Section 54-4-14 U. C. A. 1953 provides: 
"The commission shall have power by general 
or special orders, rules or regulations, or otherwise, 
to require every public u1Jility to construct, main-
tain and operaJte its '1ine, plant, system, equipment, 
apparatus, traoks and premises in such manner as 
to promote and safeguard the health and safety of 
its employees, passengers, customers, and the public, 
and to this end to prescribe among other things, the 
installation, use, maintenance and operation of ap-
propriate safety or other devices or appliances, in-
cluding interlocking or other protective devices at 
grade crossings or junctions, and block or other 
system of signaling, and !tJo establish uniform or 
other standards of construction and equipment, and 
to require the performance of any other acts which 
the health or safety of 1its employees, passengers, 
customers or the public may demand." 
Any duty which may have been imposed upon the Public 
Service Commission is by the wording of this statute a 
matter of discretion, there no words of mandate to 
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the Commission to prescribe any particular order, rule or 
regulaticm. Even 1if such duty were to be imposed upon the 
commission, that duty has been fulfilled. The commission 
promulgated rules and regulations for the installation and 
inspection of railroad highway grade crossing signal de-
vices. These rules are found in General Order No. 61 and 
Supplemental Order No. 1 dating back to June 1951, which 
order of the Public Service Commission was attached to 
the respondent's motion for summary judgment (R. 90-
100). 
This view of the discretionary nature, powers and 
duties of the Service Commission finds support in 
the language of cases which define discretionary act as de-
cisions made at planning levels as distinguished from de-
cisions made at operationa1 levels. Dalehite v. United 
States, 346 U. S. 15, 42 (1953). It seems evident thrut the 
Public Service Commission, by passing a rule or regulation, 
and exercising its discretion therein, at a planning level, 
does not become liable for the act of every private person 
or corporation who, for some reason, fails to comply with 
or implement the regulation at the operational level. 
In the above case, the Supreme Court of the United 
States, referring to the Federal Tort Claims Act whose 
language is very similar to that of the Utah act, discusses 
the theory and operation of the waiver of gX>vernmental 
immunity. The court states: 
"It is not intended that the consiilitutionality of 
legisilation, 1Jhe legality of regulations or the pro-
priety of the discretionary administrative act should 
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be tested through the medium of a damage suit for 
tort." 
It is noted that the Utah act, in Section 63-30-10 (I), 
contaiins a non-waiver of immunity where injury "arises 
out of the exercise of performance or the failure to exercise 
or perform a discretionary funotion, whether or not the 
discretion is abused." 
It is dear that, even if appellant were able to show 
a:fl facts set forth in the complaiint and establish that the 
Public Service Commission had rt;he responsibility to enforce 
the rules and regulations and failed to act, that the com-
mission would sib:ill be immune from this suit. 
Plaiintiff appears to have assumed that the Govern-
mental Immunity Act, which waives governmental immun-
ity in certain instances, applries and that the Motion for 
Summary Judgment, based upon other facts, is premature. 
It is, however, proper under Rule 56 to grant summary 
judgment based upon rthe facts as stated 1in plaintiff's com-
I}laint without need for ailowing and without the 
need for the respondent to plead by way of answer setting 
forth any defenses or facts, summary judgment becomes 
tantamount to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim, except that 1where affidav[ts or other evidentiary 
matters accompanied the motion, it was properly brougiht 
as a motion for summary judgment. The court below was 
correct in granting summary judgment for the rea,son that 
the Public Service Commission was at all ttJimes ·acting in 
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its capacity as a governmental entity of the State of Utah 
'111'1 y,cas immune from suit, such immunity having not been 
waived. It is evident from plaintiff's complaint and the 
amendment to the second cause of action therein that any 
and all acts of negligence claimed against the Public Ser-
vice Commission of the State of Utah would clearly arise 
out of the performance of, of, or exercise of a 
cliscrntionary function; namely, the promulgation of rules 
and regulations and the enforcement thereof. The plaintiff 
has failed to plead or set forth any facts which would a:!'low 
suit agaJinst the Public Service Commission of Utah. 
Respondent takes no issue with cases cited by plaintiff 
indicating summary judgment should be granted on the 
basis of the complarint aione, only under a liberal construc-
tion of the facts pleaded and assuming all such facts to be 
true a claim has been stated. We submit rthat plaintiff in 
this case given that liberal construction, and after once 
amending the complaint, sets forth no such facts. 
CONCLUSION 
The Public Service Commission is a governmental en-
tity protected with governmental immunity pursuant to 
63-30-10(1) U. C. A. (1953). lt has complied with and 
fulfilled the duties imposed upon it pursuant to 54-4-14 
U. C. A. (1953). There are no facts in dispute which would, 
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if resolved in favor of appeUant, a:l'low this suit to be main-
tained. Therefore, the summary judgment rendered by the 
District Court should be affiirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
VERL R. TOPHAM 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 Staite Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
